Do MNs 'mirror'?
It is frequently asserted that MNs respond selectively to the observation and execution of the same action (e.g., Arnstein et al., 2011; Chong et al., 2008; Dinstein et al., 2007 Dinstein et al., , 2008 , and thereby 'mirror' observed actions in the observer's motor system. For example, MNs are "visuomotor neurons that are active both during the execution of a movement and during the observation of the same movement" (Dinstein et al., 2007 (Dinstein et al., , p.1415 ). This description is typical, in that it implies that strict sensorimotor congruency e a close match between the effective actions during observation and execution e is a defining property of MNs. This definition accords with their unfortunate name, and in all likelihood, the intuition of many readers. This intuition is, however, fundamentally inconsistent with the definition of MNs used by those responsible for their discovery ["(neurons) discharged when the monkey made active movements and when it observed specific meaningful actions made by the experimenter. We called these neurons mirror neurons"; Gallese et al., 1996, p.595] . The practice of treating any unit responsive during action observation and execution as an MN, irrespective of sensorimotor congruency, continues to be routine in studies of their field properties.
So-called 'strictly congruent MNs', responsive to the same action during observation and execution, account for only 20e30% of MNs (e.g., di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996) . The majority of MNs are at best broadly congruent e responsive during the observation and execution of 'similar' actions (e.g., to the performance of grasping with the hand, but to the sight of grasping with the hand or mouth). These neurons clearly do not mirror the manner (i.e., effector, kinematics, trajectory) of action execution. The remaining MNs respond to the observation and execution of dissimilar actions (e.g., to the sight of food being placed on a surface, but the act of grasping food to eat) and have been termed logicallyrelated MNs. The existence of suppression MNs e units that fire during action performance, but are inhibited during the observation of similar actions (e.g., Kraskov et al., 2009 ) e further complicates matters. Rather than 'mirror' observed actions, such units appear to systematically prevent mirroring.
Do MNs encode goals?
The view that MNs encode the 'goals' of observed actions, and thereby contribute to 'action understanding', is frequently presented as the prevailing consensus of the field (e.g., Fabbri-Destro and Rizzolatti, 2008) . The term 'goal' is rarely
